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Abstract: The part that security au-
thorities played in the process of university 
enrolment was an example of how the social 
policy of the Party authorities got implemen-
ted. UB employees had been executing tasks 
connected with the negative selection of uni-
versity candidates since the first decree of the 
Ministry of Education that regulated that is-
sue came out (1947). Student profiles, prepa-
red by the Policy Secret (UB), were one of the 
major factors deciding whether a given young 
person would be allowed to matriculate. In 
this case the aim was to “protect university 
communities,” which in fact meant that per-
sons deemed by the authorities undesirable 
would be prevented from studying (preven-
tive actions) and those with “proper class 
origins” (peasants’ and workers’ children) 
would have their academic future secured. 
Ministry of Public Securuty (MBP) officers, 
cooperated with the various actors: the party 
Resumen: El papel que los servicios de 
seguridad jugaron en el proceso de selección 
de personal universitario es un ejemplo de 
cómo la política social del partido se practi-
có e impuso. Empleados de la Policía Secre-
ta llevaron a cabo tareas relacionadas con la 
selección de los futuros estudiantes desde 
el primer decreto del Ministerio de Educa-
ción que reguló esta cuestión en 1947. Los 
perfiles de los estudiantes, elaborados por 
la Policía Secreta, fueron determinantes para 
saber si podrían o no matricularse. El obje-
tivo era “proteger a la comunidad universi-
taria” pero en el fondo suponía señalar a las 
personas consideradas indeseables por las 
autoridades. Se les impedía estudiar (como 
acción preventiva) y los que tenían “orígenes 
de clase adecuada” (hijos de campesinos y 
de trabajadores) tenían el futuro académico 
asegurado. Los funcionarios del Ministerio de 
Seguridad Pública (MBP) trabajaron en esta 
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structures of different levels (from central to 
local ones), political and social organisations. 
Employees of the security apparatus rejected 
a large percent of candidates. In 1953 about 
47 percent of students they vetted were put 
on the proscription lists. Therefore one could 
risk a statement that the UB played crucial 
part in establishing the social origin of stu-
dent communities in 1947-1956.
Keywords: communist security appa-
ratus, universities in communist countries, 
education system in communist countries, 
communist social engineering, The Polish 
Peoples’ Republic, the university enrolment 
process.
tarea junto con las estructuras del partido en 
sus diferentes niveles (desde lo central a lo 
local), así como con las organizaciones polí-
ticas y sociales. Los empleados del aparato de 
seguridad rechazaron un gran porcentaje de 
los candidatos. En 1953 alrededor del 47% de 
los estudiantes fue vetado e inserto en las lis-
tas de proscritos. Podríamos pues decir que 
la policía secreta tuvo un papel crucial en el 
establecimiento de los orígenes sociales de la 
comunidad estudiantil entre 1947 y 1956.
Palabras clave: aparato de seguridad 
comunista, universidades en países comunis-
tas; sistema educativo en países comunistas, 
ingeniería social comunista, República Popu-
lar Polaca, proceso de selección universitario.
One of the aims of Communist social engineering was to create “people’s” 
intelligentsia.1 The factors that facilitated these plans were losses among the 
Polish intelligentsia during World War II and the need to make up for these 
losses.2 In addition, the Communist authorities did not trust members of 
that social group – even those favourable to the new regime – still perceiving 
them as affected by “bourgeois ideology.”
In this case, we deal with the negation of the spontaneous mechanisms 
of social stratification, since the communists believed that the social proc-
esses could be fully controlled and directed by them. Hence, the new strati-
fication should be the outcome of cooperation between the various actors: 
the party structures of different levels (from central to local ones), security 
apparatus and political and social organisations. We may venture a thesis 
that the university enrolment policy was an element of centrally planned 
economy. Thus the main goal of the higher education institutions – called in 
propaganda “new factories” – was to provide the national industry with the 
predetermined number of the professionals.
1 On the creation of the “new intelligentsia,” see e.g. H. Palska, Nowa inteligencja w Polsce 
Ludowej. Świat przedstawień i elementy rzeczywistości, Warszawa 1994; J. Lewandowski, Ro-
dowód społeczny powojennej inteligencji Polskiej 1944-1949, Szczecin 1991; M. Mazur, O czło-
wieku tendencyjnym. Obraz nowego człowieka w propagandzie komunistycznej w okresie Polski 
Ludowej i PRL 1944-1956, Lublin 2009.
2 About 60 percent of lawyers, 39 percent of doctors, 27 percent of Catholic priests died 
during World War II. Enormous losses were caused by the Holocaust; before 1939, about a 
half of people employed in the so-called free professions were the Jews (P. Madajczyk, Zmiany 
społeczne w Polsce pod wpływem II wojny światowej [in:] Rzeczpospolita utracona. Następstwa 
nazizmu i komunizmu na ziemiach polskich, ed. J. Eisler, K. Rokicki, (Warszawa 2010), 80-81).
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The student admissions policy was not based on prerequisites of 
knowledge and skills, therefore it created the mechanisms of negative and 
artificial social selection, the process fully controlled and directed by the 
communists. The “new”, “people’s” intelligentsia was the stratum without 
the roots, completely alien to the ethos of the former intelligentsia (especial-
ly to its independence from the government). Contrary to his predecessors, 
the “people’s” intellectualist should be “progressive”, devoted to the ideol-
ogy, faithful, submissive and grateful to the regime. He ought to serve the 
proletariat, precisely to be at the full disposal to the Communist Party (the 
embodiment of the proletariat): Speaking at the University of Wrocław, the 
representative of the Ministry of Education T. Dowjat said, “We want to get 
the largest number of educated people, who would work with enthusiasm 
and gratitude for enabling them to get higher education”3. 
Education was to become the major way of “producing” the “new” 
stratum. Schools, especially universities – although one may also consider 
the role of high schools as the stage preceding higher education – were to 
shape both the “new intelligentsia” and the new academic and party person-
nel, recruited mostly from among young workers and peasants. Party ideo-
logues perceived those groups as the least affected by the remnants of the 
former system. They were supposed to be characterized by a weak link to 
the former axiology and worldview – the “symbolic universe”4 rejected by 
Marxists. Those people were considered the blank page to be filled entirely 
according to the Communist model of upbringing.
What is more, the stratum formed this way, after being subjected to a 
proper ideological education, was to pass on (without their own interpre-
tation) the official doctrine to other members of society. Communists thus 
reserved for the intelligentsia a strictly instrumental role – to use the propa-
ganda language of the time – of the “officers’ corps of the working classes, 
building socialism under the Party’s leadership.”5
3 After T. Suleja, Uniwersytet Wrocławski w okresie centralizmu stalinowskiego 1950-1955 
[University of Wrocław in the Era of Stalinist Centralism 1950-1955], Wrocław 1995, f. 117; 
H. Palska, Ideologia komunistyczna a problem inteligencji [Communist Ideology and the Prob-
lem of the Intelligentsia] [in:] Rzeczpospolita utracona. Następstwa nazizmu i komunizmu na 
ziemiach polskich, [The Lost Polish Republic. Consequences of Nazism and Communism in the 
Polish Lands] eds. J. Eisler, K. Rokicki, Warszawa 2010, p. 133 ff.
4 H. Świda-Ziemba, „My nowe życie tworzymy i nowy ład” [in:] Do i od socjalizmu. Dwa prze-
łomy w ciągu półwiecza w Polsce, ed. A. Siciński, Warszawa 1998, p. 96-98.
5 After J. Szczepański, Zakończenie [in:] Wykształcenie a pozycja społeczna inteligencji, ed. 
idem, Łódź 1960, p. 464; H. Palska, Nowa inteligencja…, p. 47-48, 62, 64.
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In this case, the goal was to artificially and under strict control cre-
ate yet another social stratum, which for the Communist authorities would 
become –as noticed by Hanna Palska– one of the major ways to legitimize 
their rule and the new regime. For the aim was to create a group disinclined 
to rebel, since they would be “grateful” for the possibility of “social advance-
ment” that was “given by the Party” and was impossible to obtain outside 
the socialist country.6  In addition, the new social group was to be deprived 
of its predecessor’s attributes (the so-called “capitalist burden”) such as in-
dependence and versatility.7 The group was to not fulfil a utilitarian function 
of professionals trained in narrow and specific disciplines.
These activities were accompanied by the reduction of universities’ 
autonomy. The most important tool in the implementation of that plan was 
the decree of 28 November 1947 regarding “the organization of science and 
higher education.” According to the decree, universities became subject to 
the Minister of Education (since April 1950 the Minister of Science and High-
er Education) who “was in control of science, higher education and research 
institutions.” The act of 15 December 1951 summarized all the changes re-
garding the status and functioning of higher education, subordinating uni-
versities and their research workers to full control (in fact, surveillance) of 
the Party and the state.8 Simultaneously, the structure, activities, and ide-
ology of all universities in the country got homogenized. The act of 1951 
abolished the election of university authorities. Since then, vice-chancellors, 
pro-vice-chancellors, deans, deputy deans, and even heads of smaller organi-
zation units had been appointed by the Minister of Science and Higher Edu-
cation. This way universities in Poland, similarly to those in the Soviet Russia 
and other communist states, became part of the state structure subordinate 
6 H. Palska, Nowa inteligencja…, p. 7, 28-94; B. Gołębiowski, Dramat awansu generacji 
zetempowskiej [in:] Zjednoczenie polskiego ruchu młodzieżowego i powstanie ZMP. Materiały 
z sesji naukowej zorganizowanej przez Komisję Historii Ruchu Młodzieżowego przy Zarządzie 
Wojewódzkim ZSMP w Białymstoku w 40-tą rocznicę powstania ZMP, 24 czerwca 1988, ed. Z.J. 
Hirsz, Białystok 1990, p. 113-114. The Marxists defined so-called proletarian intelligentsia 
as “an elite, created by a process of upward social mobility sponsored and encouraged by re-
gime” (S. Fitzpatrick, Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union 1921-1934, Cambridge 
1979, p. 4).
7 Since “the liberal ideal of the independent-minded, morally autonomous individual was 
not compatible with the Bolshevik vision of civil society” (S. Finkel, On the Ideological Front: 
the Russian Intelligentsia and the Making of the Soviet Public Sphere, New Haven 2007, p. 3).
8 Ustawa o szkolnictwie wyższym i o pracownikach naukowych z dnia 15 XII 1951 r., „Dzien-
nik Ustaw” 1952, no. 6, item 38.
THE SECRET POLICE AS A MEANS OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING IN THE POLISH PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 241
CIAN, 18/2 (2015), 237-259
to central planning and supervision, including the number and structure of 
student community.9
At the same time many eminent scholars, especially humanists such 
as Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Maria and Stanisław Ossowski, Roman Ingarden, or 
Władysław Konopczyński, were either removed from their academic posi-
tions or deprived of the right to teach. 
University enrolment (general rules)
The abolition of universities’ autonomy did not mark the end of Party authori-
ties’ struggle to bring the university community under control. University en-
rolment policy, connected to particular levels of education, was aimed at im-
plementing Communist social and ideological goals.10 According to the plan of 
1949, in 1955 students with rural and working class origins were to make 75 
percent of the student community. It was assumed, however, that these changes 
would take place at the cost of other groups, especially the “old” intelligentsia. 
University enrolment simply became one of the elements of authori-
ty-controlled process of social stratification. An attempt was made at using 
and reversing one of the schools’ functions, that is the solidification of social 
structure.11 Communists’ goal was to change particular elements of social 
reality and perform a capitis demimutio on the people with roots in commu-
nities and groups arbitrarily rejected by the Communist ideology (enrolment 
was part of Communist social engineering).12 The major goal was to submit 
candidates and their relatives to a vetting process regarding their social ori-
gins and political stance.
9 On the Sovietization of higher education in Central and Eastern Europe see: J. Connelly, 
Captive University. The Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish Higher Education, 1945-
1956, Chapel Hill and London 2000, p. 22-70; P. Hübner, Polityka naukowa w Polsce w latach 
1944-1953. Geneza systemu, vol. 1-2, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków 1992. On the control of uni-
versities by Party authorities in the USSR, see e.g.  B. Tromly, Making the Soviet Inteligentsia. 
Universities and Intellectual Life under Stalin and Khrushchev, Cambridge 2013.
10 On the rules of school and university enrolment during the Stalinist regime, see D. 
Gałaszewska-Chilczuk, J. Wołoszyn, Od przedszkolaka do studenta. Kryteria selekcji społecznej 
i polityczne w edukacji lat 1947-1956, Lublin 2012.
11 P. Bourdieu, J.C. Passeron, Reprodukcja. Elementy teorii system nauczania, Warszawa 
1990, p. 220.
12 J. Goćkowski, Komunistyczna technologia społeczna: doktryna i praktyka stworzenia 
„innego świata” [in:] Oblicza komunistycznego zniewolenia. Między nauką a literaturą, ed. K. 
Brzechczyn, Poznań 2009, p. 48-50.
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In the middle of 1947, before universities lost their autonomy, the Cen-
tral Committee (KC) of the Polish Workers’ Party (PPR) ordered 30 percent 
of the seats to be reserved for working class youth, and 20 percent for rural 
youth. Primary admission was granted to the members of the Association of 
Youth Fight (ZWM) and those generally referred to as “democrats.”13 In the 
future, special committees were to be responsible for vetting to-be students. 
As a result, the Minister of Education issued a decree (21 July 1947) in which 
Recruitment Commissions were appointed at each faculty. They consisted 
not only of academic teachers, but also of the so-called social factor (mem-
bers of Trade Unions, the Union for Peasant Mutual Aid) and a delegate of the 
Ministry of Education. 
At the same time, a candidate had to provide a certificate of his or her 
political and social attitude. These certificates were issued by numerous po-
litical, educational, and social institutions, including official youth organiza-
tions. Proscription lists, on which “the names of firm enemies of democracy” 
were placed, were supposed to be compiled during the Polish legislative 
election (January 1946) by regional boards of the University Association of 
Youth Fight “Życie.” At first, the certificates were verified by delegates of the 
Ministry of Education and Regional Committees (KW) of PPR/Polish United 
Workers’ Party (PZPR). After 1949, this task was also entrusted to Party trios, 
appointed for that very purpose and consisting of, among others, members 
of the official Polish Youth Union (ZMP). It is worth mentioning that these 
subjects gathered information about students in numerous ways. In Lublin, 
trio members questioned janitors or asked the Citizens’ Militia (MO) for help. 
Opinions of those bodies went through the proper KW PZPR straight to the 
delegate of the Ministry of Education, never seeing dean’s office. 
 As a side note to these regulations, one may also mention the de-
cree of the Ministry of Education of April 1949, which establish a two-month 
period for submitting applications and taking entry exams.14 The delay was 
supposed to give security authorities time to verify candidates’ documents.
In 1950 the rules of student vetting got changed. According to the KC 
PZPR’s instruction, these activities were to be performed by School and Poviat 
Recruitment Commissions. Their faculty counterparts were still operational, 
13 On the control over the personal structure of student communities, see: J. Lewandowski, 
op. cit., p. 87-126; D. Gałaszewski, Zasady i formy selekcji kandydatów na wyższe uczelnie w Polsce 
w latach 1947-1956 [in:] Studia i materiały z dziejów opozycji i oporu społecznego, ed. Ł. Kamiń-
ski, vol. III, Wrocław 2000, p. 3-19; Cz. Lewandowski, Kierunki tak zwanej ofensywy ideologicznej 
w polskiej oświacie, nauce i szkołach wyższych w latach 1944-1948, Wrocław 1993, p. 193-15.
14 J. Lewandowski, op. cit., p. 109-110.
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and their goal was to verify candidates’ knowledge. Political and social selec-
tion was entrusted to school commissions, which issued “a certificate of social 
background, talent, and social work” to high school graduates. These opinions 
were delivered to Poviat Recruitment Commissions, where they –together 
with opinions issued by security authorities– became the basis for an opinion 
whether a given student should be allowed to attend university. Negative opin-
ions were to be issued “only regarding elements hostile to the People’s Poland 
on political grounds, without considering their social background.” However, 
representatives of Party authorities were afraid that too many candidates 
would get rejected. That is why the Ministry delegate in Lublin complained 
that about 30 percent of the candidates were given a negative opinion.15
In 1950 the so-called individual objection appeared, that is a negative 
opinion given by a Poviat Recruitment Commission or the Secret Police (UB), 
which prevented a candidate from attending university. At the same time, 
School and Poviat Recruitment Commissions were allowed to issue “diplo-
mas of a science and social work leader” which exempted from entry exams. 
The instruction of 1950 made it clear, however, that such a diploma could be 
issued to no more than two students in a school.
In 1951, instead of the certificates, questionnaires and candidate cards got 
introduced. In the same year, regional Vetting Commissions would issue opin-
ions regarding those candidates who reapplied to university and who previously 
had to acquire a “morality certificate,” issued by proper regional authorities.
The final decision was made by the Faculty Commission, and since 
1951 – the University Commission consisting of the vice-chancellor, a del-
egate of the Ministry of Education, and a representative of the University 
Party Unit. The activities of all these institutions were supposed to remain 
secret, for if rejected, a student was not given the reason. 
The list of people who were given priority admission demands a sepa-
rate treatment. Privileged candidates were mentioned in the decrees of the 
Minister of Education and circulars of the Prime Minister. In 1948, candi-
dates were divided into three groups regarding their social background. The 
first group consisted of children of “medium-sized peasants and smallhold-
ers,” workers, working intelligentsia, and autochthon youth from the “Re-
claimed Lands”; these people were reserved 60 percent of all seats.16 The 
15 The delegate wrote about cases when children of smallholders, technical intelligentsia 
or teachers got rejected it they were not members of the ZMP (D. Gałaszewski, op. cit., p. 8-9). 
16 Decree of the Ministry of Education of 19 May 1948, “Dziennik Ustaw”, no. 29, 1948, 
item 196.
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second group included “participants of the 1939-1945 war,” “activists” of of-
ficial youth organizations (mostly the ZWM/ZMP) and teachers. A year later 
“working intelligentsia” got moved to the second category, which also includ-
ed “victims of the enemies of democratic Poland.” In 1949, the authorities 
decided to introduce a more strict selection and the trios mentioned before 
got created. In 1951 one could be assigned to the “privileged group” on the 
basis of a new criterion: parents’ contribution to the creation of the system. 
The third group consisted of all the people who did not qualify to groups one 
and two. They were given 15 percent of seats. 
One got assigned to a particular group by technical secretaries of Fac-
ulty Recruitment Commissions under the supervision of the Ministry del-
egate. Those people’s role was mainly to eliminate universities’ administra-
tion from such parts of the recruitment process as accepting applications 
and not analyzing candidates’ social background.17 
The system was directly borrowed from the Soviet Union. In 1928, the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union agreed to a 
similar solution, introducing, among other things, contingents, especially in 
technical education. According to the accepted solutions, 65 percent of all 
seats –the number was later raised by 5 percent– was reserved for candi-
dates with working class background.18
The mechanisms of vetting, which to some extent abolish the myth 
of common access to higher education in the Polish People’s Republic, had 
been in force until 1956. In 1956, the Ministry of Education abolished Poviat 
Recruitment Commissions, and a year later “class origin” ceased to be one of 
the criteria of privilege regarding access to higher education. 
The role of members of the repression apparatus in the university enrolment 
action   
Security authorities took part in the creation of “people’s intelligentsia” as 
well, especially by interfering in personal and social structure of student 
groups. As a response to the authorities’ demands, from 1947 to 1953 the 
17 National Archive in Lublin, Regional Board of the ZMP, 754, ZG ZAMP Resolution on the 
organization of work during the summer of 1949, k. 14-15; ibidem, 758, Report on the uni-
versity enrollment in the academic year 1949/1950 at Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in 
Lublin, b.d., k. 194-196.
18 K. E. Bailes, Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin. Origins of Soviet Technical 
Intelligentsia, 1917-1941, Princeton 1978, p. 193.
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Ministry of Public Security (MBP) had regularly issued instructions which 
specified the roles of members of the repression apparatus regarding uni-
versity candidates’ vetting. In this case the UB officers took part in the nega-
tive selection, forming opinions based on political and “class” criteria. Their 
opinions were binding for the authorities responsible for issuing “morality 
certificates” and members of Recruitment Commissions.
In case of university candidates, the repression apparatus’ goal was 
to prevent the group that the state authorities for various reasons deemed 
undesirable from attending university. The MBP documents label the afore-
mentioned activities “preventive actions.”19 MBP officers took part in the 
negative selection of candidates, giving them opinions based on political and 
“class” criteria. The opinion formed by the Secret Police (UB) became bind-
ing for the members of state and school administration (in the latter case, 
for the members of the so-called recruitment commissions) whose task was 
to issue a certificate confirming whether a given student may attend uni-
versity. Members of the Polish United Workers’ Party at Łódź University of 
Technology stressed the impact the UB opinions had on the fate of young 
people. They informed that in cases when evaluations made by the repres-
sion apparatus and those conducted by the Party and education authorities 
were discrepant, the evaluation conducted by the UB was binding. Similarly 
in Toruń, all questionable cases were settled by a board with a member of 
the repression apparatus present.20 Local recruitment commissions usually 
did not question opinions issued by the UB, even when almost all high school 
graduates got disqualified. 
It is worth mentioning that the repression apparatus almost imme-
diately applied solutions approved by the education authorities. First in-
structions regarding university enrolment the Ministry of Education issued 
in 1947. A candidate was required to present a “morality certificate” issued 
by a proper district governor. At the same time a proper act was issued by 
Department V of the MBP. That first document, accompanied by the com-
plementary instruction, included all elements that would characterize the 
19 Archive of the Institute of National Remembrance In Warsaw (AIPN), BU, 0649/4, vol. I, 
Report of the V Department of the MBP on 1948, Warsaw, 15 February 1949, k. 20.
20 The author of the report wrote that “ no candidate disqualified by the UB was admitted” 
(the Central Archives of  Modern Records in Warsaw (AAN), the Central Committee of the 
PZPR (KC PZPR), 237/XVI-128, The Report of KW PZPR representatives in Łódź on the pro-
ceedings of the University Recruitment Commission at Łódź University of Technology, Łódź, 
bd., 1949, k. 42; ibidem 237/XVI-123, Candidate selection at Nicolaus Copernicus University 
in Toruń [1949], k. 9).
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range of involvement of the repression apparatus in the process of university 
enrolment.21 The main goal was to subordinate decisions of the state admin-
istration to the UB, for district governors could issue “morality certificates” 
only after they got approved by a district UB office, which did not have to 
substantiate its decision. 
In addition, already in 1947 first proscription lists got compiled and 
sent to local Secret Police offices (WUBP) in the cities with universities those 
who did not pass the evaluation wanted to attend (the application submitted 
in the local district governor’s office should include the name of the univer-
sity). In this case officers of the repression apparatus, in order to prevent a 
given young person from entering university, could intervene directly with 
members of university committees.
The most important task of UB representatives was to gather infor-
mation about students who were to graduate from high schools and were 
intending to continue education. The UB’s goal was to “catch” students with 
“hostile political tendencies” and determine their social background. “A stu-
dent should not be allowed to enter university on the basis of the materials 
testifying to his hostile, reactionary activities. Students closely connected to 
their families and capitalist and kulak backgrounds should not be allowed to 
enter university as well.”22 In 1947, one of the goals was to prevent people 
connected to the Polish Peasant Party from entering university; a year later, 
the same rule got applied to graduates of monastic schools. The rejected 
groups became a peculiar example of social classification conducted by the 
Communist authorities, especially by the repression apparatus. The list in-
cluded in the Ministry’s documents consisted of groups considered a priori 
“the concrete base for the class enemy where they the element deemed use-
ful is recruited.” According to the recommendation of the director of Depart-
ment V of the MBP, Julia Brystygier – lists “should primarily include foreign 
class elements [underlined in the original document] (sons of merchants, 
wealthy kulaks [sic!], high Sanacja officials), elements notorious for hostile 
propaganda conducted in schools.”23  One should also add youths from Cath-
olic organizations and those formerly linked to the anti-Communist under-
ground. That is why the MBP reminded regional officials to include in their 
21 See e.g. AIPN, BU, 01206/75, vol. 1, Instruction on issuing morality certificates to uni-
versity candidates, Warsaw, 9 August 1947, k. 38.
22 Ibidem, Instruction no. 2/51 on the participation of repression apparatus employees in 
university enrolment, Warsaw, 1 February 1951, k. 225-227.
23 Ibidem, Instruction no. 29/49 on the participation of repression apparatus employees in 
university enrolment, Warsaw, 24 August 1949, k. 175.
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reports detailed descriptions of candidates’ social background. The criteria 
of negative vetting got systematically broadened (for example, in 1952 can-
didates would be held responsible if their parents and relatives did not fulfil 
their obligations to the state).
According to Communists, people who belonged to the groups men-
tioned above should not receive free university education, which should be 
a privilege of “loyal” citizens. This way of thinking is best exemplified by the 
argument given by the PZPR City Committee in Siemianowice regarding the 
removal of a student of the Medical Academy (Akademia Lekarska) in Rokit-
nica (the Katowice province), supposedly a son of a “rich man” and a former 
member of the Hitlerjugend. Party authorities demanded the student to be 
expelled “in the name of principles and [sic!] universities are for workers’ 
and peasants’ sons, and democrats”24.
It should be also pointed out that persons at the time referred to as 
“class related” would sometimes be put on the lists as well. During university 
enrolment in Poznań, half of the candidates the repression apparatus and 
PZPR structures deemed unfit for university education came from working 
class families.25 All the lists – before they were sent to local UB offices – got 
approved by the KC PZPR.
Vetting model applied by the UB
It is also worth to know how regional offices were supposed – according 
to the MBP guidelines – vet candidates (the ministry instruction of August 
1949 described the process on the example of a particular unit – the WUBP 
in Lublin26). The Propaganda Department of a given KW PZPR was supposed 
to submit to the director of Section V of the WUBP (the unit responsible for 
youth control) lists of all university candidates, a separate list for each fac-
ulty. The lists, together with the forms filled by students, were delivered to 
Section V by the so-called trusted employees of boards of education.  
During the vetting, the repression apparatus collaborated with local 
Party organizations. That is why in 1950 the MBP planned to appoint a spe-
cial employee in each local UB office, who would be responsible for contacts 
24 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XVI-77, Note from the KM PZPR secretary in Siemianowice Śląskie 
to the KP PZPR in Siemianowice on expelling one of the students of Medical Academy in Rok-
itnica, Siemianowice Śląskie, 22 October 1949, k. 33.
25 Ibidem, 237/XVI-179, Report on the university enrollment [in Poznań], [1950], k. 52.
26 AIPN, BU, 01206/75, vol. 1, Instruction no. 29/49…, k. 175.
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with the Party. His task was to deliver to the representative of the local com-
mittee the list of “unwanted” persons.27 On the other hand, local Party activ-
ists responsible for the enrolment process would receive proper instructions 
regarding constant contact with the UB, which would be the primary source 
of information about candidates’ attitudes and worldviews.28
The materials about students would be delivered to the employees 
of proper departments of the WUBP, who would send them to poviat units. 
Then, the data provided by students (on special application forms) would 
get juxtaposed with the data gathered by the UB. 
Information about students’ attitudes came from many different 
sources. In the Lublin district it would be provided, for example, by members 
of the so-called staff network. It was a system, created by the local repression 
apparatus, of collecting information about the attitudes of students, teach-
ers, and catechists by staff members of local boards and designated repre-
sentatives of school boards of the ZMP (in both cases “proven members of 
the Party”).29
During the next stage, poviat authorities compiled lists of students 
who should be allowed (or not) attend university. The lists, accompanied 
by high school graduates’ profiles, would be delivered to the provincial unit. 
There, among other things, candidate catalogues would be compared with 
central registers sent from Warsaw. As a result, the UB would prepare a sepa-
rate list to be delivered to a given KW PZPR. From there lists of students to be 
rejected would be delivered to Party members responsible for the working 
of university recruitment commissions. In 1951 the above-mentioned lists 
(after being approved by the head of a proper Department of the WUBP) 
would be delivered to the representatives of the KP PZPR who would use 
them during the proceedings of poviat recruitment commissions.30
27 Ibidem, Instruction no. 13/50 on the participation of repression apparatus employees in 
university enrolment, Warsaw, 13 April 1950, k. 226.
28 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XVI-179, Report on the university enrollment [in Poznań], [1950], 
k. 46.
29 AIPN Lu, 059/9, Report of Section VI of Department V of the WUBP in Lublin on cat-
echists for the period 12 August-1 September 1949, bd., k. 157. The “network” was created 
on the initiative of the WUBP in response to Instrukcja nr 26 dyrektor Departamentu V MBP w 
Warszawiepłk Julii Brystygier w sprawie rozpracowania katechetów, Warszawa 10 VIII 1949 r. 
[in:] Metody pracy operacyjnej aparatu bezpieczeństwa wobec Kościołów i związków wyznanio-
wych 1945–1989, ed. A. Dziurok, Warszawa 2004, p. 133.
30 AIPN, BU, 01206/76, vol. 1, General note no. 3 of the Associate Director of Department V 
of the MBP, Karol Więckowski, on the implementation of the instruction regarding university 
enrolment, Warsaw, 24 April 1951, k. 41.
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The last recipient of local registers was the MBP, whose members 
would prepare the national proscription list. It would be delivered, by local 
Party authorities or KC PZPR delegates, to faculty recruitment commissions. 
On the basis of the instructions they received, members of that “body” would 
decide about the fate of young people. Sometimes the Secret Police would 
deliver the above-mentioned registers to trusted members of recruitment 
commissions. 
It should be stressed that it was important for Party and security au-
thorities to keep the part the secret police played in university enrolment a 
secret. Members of recruitment commissions were instructed not to refer 
during the exam to the materials provided by the repression apparatus.
However, the part the Secret Police played in the working of recruit-
ment commissions is confirmed by a fragment of the document (probably) 
from the second half of 1949. Its author wrote that “This year we’ve put em-
phasis on fully including our apparatus (unofficially) in the working of ad-
mission commissions.”31    
Practice
Numerous advices and comments included in the MBP instructions prove 
that members of local offices applied the criteria of candidates’ evaluation 
in a rather random and routine way. That is why in 1953 local employees 
were warned not to treat university enrolment as a “short-term action.”32 A 
common phenomenon – mentioned usually by members of local Party com-
mittees – became UB employees copying reports prepared by local ZMP or-
ganizations (which often used the vetting process as a means to get even 
with disagreeable organization members).
UB employees would often abuse the vetting process. Negative opin-
ions were given even to ZMP activists, participants of the Rally of Young 
Shock Workers of the People’s Poland (1952). The WUBP in Wrocław put 
on the black list an “activist” leader of a scouting troop only because one of 
his protégés was a member of a Catholic organization. In 1947, the Lublin 
repression apparatus gave negative opinions to all doctors’ children who 
wanted to enter Medicine Faculty at the local Maria Curie-Skłodowska Uni-
versity (by the way, the former leader of the Bielsko Biała Hitlerjugend was 
31 AIPN, BU, MBP, 491, Motions regarding the preventive-repressive action [1949], k. 32.
32 Ibidem, BU, 01206/75, vol. 1, Instruction no. 1/53, Warsaw, 16 February 1953, k. 351.
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not put on the list). Sometimes a negative opinion was given to all mem-
bers of a given school (for example, in Stargard Szczeciński – 28 out of 29 
graduates) or to a large group (in 1950 in Sokołów Podlaski half of high 
school graduates).33 That is why even the MBP leaders would admit that 
between 1947 and 1950 “a certain hastiness regarding rejecting university 
applicants”34 had taken place.  
Due to the negative propaganda effects of the situation discussed 
above (the rejection of a high percentage of young people contradicted the 
thesis about the common access to education and shown the People’s Poland 
in bad light35), the MBP had to intervene. As a result, the order was issued to 
revise and – if necessary – change negative decisions made by local offices. In 
some cases the number of rejections that had to be changed reached 40-50 
percent. In Brzozów (the Rzeszów district), out of 16 high school graduates 
rejected by poviat UB structures, after the consultations with the WUBP in 
Rzeszów, negative opinions were given to six persons.36
In addition, normative acts issued by the MBP introduced many proce-
dures whose aim was to reduce the significant number of negative opinions. 
The procedures were restricted to careful vetting of each candidate and de-
tailed justification of each negative opinion. If district UB units were unable 
to find grounds on which a rejection could be based, they were required to 
return the profile to the local office recommending the person to be crossed 
out of the register. What is more, the centre in Warsaw kept reminding that 
opinions about high school graduates should be the result of systematic, 
year-long work of officers “responsible for supervising high schools.”37 Be-
fore the process of opinion-making would begin, local units were supposed 
to monitor high school communities so that “hostile, suspicious element in 
33 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XVI-122, Note of the KW PZPR in Szczecin regarding university en-
rollment in the Szczecin district [1950], k. 83-84; T. Łabuszewski, Działania represyjne UB wo-
bec podziemia i społeczeństwa na terenie powiatu Sokołów Podlaski w latach 1945-1956 [in:] 
Powiat Sokołów Podlaski. Materiały z sesji naukowej „Represje i opór przeciw rządom komuni-
stycznym w powiecie Sokołów Podlaski po 1944”, ed. K. Krajewski, Warszawa 2009, p. 127). 
34 AIPN, BU, 01206/75, vol. 1, Instruction no. 2/51…, k. 291.
35 Representatives of the MBP admitted that these phenomena “caused bitterness and dis-
trust of the People’s Poland” (AIPN Lu, 055/43, Instruction no. 4/52 supplement to instruc-
tion no. 2 of 1 February 1951 regarding university enrolment in the country and abroad , 
Warsaw, 19 February 1952, k. 32).
36 The black list of the Brzozów office consisted of students who – according to the UB – 
“came from alien class families and themselves are firm enemies,” after: P. Chmielowiec, Urząd 
bezpieczeństwa w Brzozowie 1944-1956, Rzeszów 2008, p. 283.
37 AIPN, BU, 01206/75, vol. 1, Instruction no. 1/53..., k. 354.
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high schools, which will become the subject of reports”38 could be detected 
in advance.  
At the same time, employees of the Ministry would reject a large per-
cent of candidates. In 1953 about 47 percent of students they vetted were 
put on black lists. Five years before the MBP rejected 3000 candidates from 
the whole country.39
Members of recruitment committees used various mechanisms to pre-
vent students with negative opinions from entering university. The method 
that was used least often was aimed at making it difficult to submit documents 
that were required by the university. Usually, however, a candidate’s name was 
removed from the so-called preferred group (persons with working class and 
peasant background) and moved to the last category, which limited one’s ac-
cess to university education. Such activities were explained by, for example, 
the lack of documents confirming one’s social background. In that case stu-
dents rejected by the repression apparatus were given the pretext of the “lack 
of seats.” At the beginning of 1948, the WUBP in Lublin informed about the list 
of 112 local high school graduates who would not receive their indexes (they 
passed the exam, yet were rejected under the pretext of the lack of seats).
The method that was used most often, however, aimed at preventing 
students from the proscription list from passing the entry exam. If members 
of the commission were Party activists or members of the so-called social 
organizations, they would often fail the written assignment. The next stage 
– compulsory since 1947 – was the ideological exam known as the knowl-
edge about Poland and the Contemporary World (according to the Party in-
structions, this way “the youth openly reactionary” would get eliminated). 
Simultaneously, persons with negative opinions from the repression appa-
ratus would be prevented from entering university. In Poznań, the exami-
nation board received the list of persons unfit for university education in 
advance. The KW PZPR in Szczecin informed about the compulsory “failing” 
of the youth with ties to Catholic youth organizations.40 In addition, recruit-
38 AIPN Lu, 055/65, Guildelines issued by head of the WUBP in Lublin, lieutenant colonel 
Bolesław Krzywiński, regarding university enrolment in the country and abroad, Lublin, 9 
February 1954, k. 18.
39 AIPN, BU, 01206/71, vol. 1, Report of Section IV of Departmen V of the MBP on July 1953, 
Warsaw, 11 August 1953, k. 95; ibidem, 0649/4, vol. 1, Information on spy-operational activi-
ties of Department V of the MBP and its field counterparts, Warsaw, 27 October 1949, k. 79.
40 D. Gałaszewski, op. cit., p. 16; AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XVI-179, Report on the university 
enrolment [in Poznań], [1950?]. p. 49; ibidem, 237/XVI-206, Evaluation of the recruitment 
and report on the execution of the KW PZPR’s [in Szczecin] resolutions regarding universities, 
Szczecin, 20 October 1950, k. 136.
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ment representatives attempted to “flunk” candidates indicated by the UB 
also during subject exams. That is why the representative (a mathematician) 
at Łódź University of Technology would prevent candidates from passing 
mathematics and physics exams. At the same time, knowledge deficiency of 
persons with “proper class background” would get overlooked. Members of 
recruitment committees at Łódź universities were instructed to show leni-
ency to candidates who were less prepared but showed political and social 
engagement.41 However, in order to disguise the role of the repression ap-
paratus in the enrolment process, a member of the Communist Party would 
get rejected. In 1947, the delegate of the Minister of Education at Nicolaus 
Copernicus University in Toruń (responsible for the enrollment) informed 
about the negative opinion given to a member of the Polish Workers’ Party 
whose name was previously put on the proscription list.   
The fact that candidates were often well-prepared made it difficult to 
eliminate the unwanted ones. Simultaneously, the UB employees had to pac-
ify the protests of university authorities and professors who objected to re-
moving some of the students. In many cases, however, these disagreements 
were resolved in the repression apparatus’ favour. That outcome was facili-
tated by the attitude of those members of recruitment commissions who be-
longed to official organizations (Trade Unions or the ZMP).
The last sentence points to the important phenomenon connected with 
the mechanisms of selection, namely the cooperation of UB representatives 
and members of recruitment committees, especially on the level of particu-
lar universities. A case in point is faculty commissions responsible for con-
ducting and grading entry exams. The cooperation usually went as planned. 
UB employees would praise especially the attitude of the members of re-
cruitment commissions nominated by trade unions. The Party structures in 
Poznań gave to theirs representatives clear directions regarding the need 
to maintain contact with UB officers responsible for the enrolment process. 
Another method of preventing students from continuing education re-
quired persons who passed the enrolment process to be crossed out from 
the admission list. This method was applied to the candidates who received 
negative opinions from the members of the repression apparatus. In many 
cases the above-mentioned situations were caused by the delays in the work 
of the repression apparatus – its employees would deliver proscription lists 
41 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XVI-89, Protocol from the conference of members of university and 
faculty members of Łódź universities which took place at the Łódź Committee of the PZPR, 22 
August 1951, b.d., k. 30.
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too late, after the entry exams. In 1950, the WUPB in Poznań revised the list 
of candidates for the Faculty of Dentistry and Medicine at the local Medical 
Academy after the entry exams. 30 newly admitted students got crossed out 
from the admission list.42 A year later, the University Recruitment Commis-
sion at Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin, after receiving deci-
sions from the Faculty Commissions, had to introduce a series of corrections 
in the admission catalogue. All these changes were aimed at “mainly correct-
ing the social structure of first-year students.”43 Therefore local Party struc-
tures would advise UB employees to get acquainted with candidate lists and 
remove the persons with negative opinions in order to “find a way to reject 
candidates on proper grounds.”44
Another issue, mentioned by the representatives of the PZPR authori-
ties, concerned the discrepancy between the lists prepared by local struc-
tures of the repression apparatus and the MBP catalogues. It meant that local 
offices would send their own lists before they got verified by the centre in 
Warsaw. Simultaneously, the Ministry would inform security offices about 
the changes in the opinions of high school students those offices provided. 
For example, similar cases took place in Olsztyn (Ryszard Pietrzyk got ad-
mitted due to the positive opinion of the local WUBP, but the decision was 
revoked after the MBP list arrived). A reverse situation took place in case of 
Wacław Dutkowski who applied to one of the Warsaw universities. 
Employees’ tardiness and the lack of consistency in opinions of par-
ticular units of the repression apparatus resulted in the negative evaluation 
of the apparatus’ involvement in the enrolment process. In 1949, PZPR au-
thorities reached a conclusion that the UB was lacking training to conduct 
“such an extensive task as opinion-making.”45 
Complaints of particular units of the PZPR regarding the tardiness of 
repression apparatus’ employees provoked MBP’s reaction. It remained its 
employees that profiles should be prepared in advance, even before recruit-
ment commissions got appointed.46
42 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XVI-179, Report on university enrolment in Poznań [1950], k. 46; J. 
Lewandowski, Rodowód społeczny powojennej inteligencji Polskiej 1944-1949, Szczecin 1991, 
p. 117-118.
43 AAN, Ministry of Higher Education and Science (MSWiN), 1184, Report on the activities 
of the UMCS University Recruitment Commission regarding university enrolment in the aca-
demic year 1951/1952, b.d., k. 28.
44 Ibidem, KC PZPR, 237/XVI-179, Report on university enrolment in Poznań [1950], k. 49.
45 Ibidem, 237/XVI-122, Report on enrolment in the academic year 1949/1950 in Warsaw, 
b.d., k. 43.
46 In 1950 field offices were supposed to finish gathering profiles by July. A year later that 
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The above-mentioned procedures allowed repression apparatus’ em-
ployees to discipline and control young people. In this case the aim was to 
“protect university communities,” which in fact meant that persons deemed 
by the authorities undesirable would be prevented from studying (preven-
tive actions) and those with “proper class origins” would have their academic 
future secured. Therefore it is worth to have a closer look at reasons behind 
candidates’ rejection on the examples of the PUBP in Łańcut (the Rzeszów 
district) and Kraśnik (the Lublin district) in 1951-1952.47 In the first town, 
the Poviat Recruitment Commission gave six negative opinions (out of 193 
candidates) to persons applying to universities. In Kraśnik, ten students of 
High School in Zakrzówek were given negative opinions. Among them were 
persons considered to have “kulak origins.” Students had to pay for their par-
ents’ and relatives’ past or profession (fathers or brothers used to belong 
to the independence underground or political opposition, or were millers). 
Acquaintance with local priests was also to the young people’s disadvantage. 
Among other factors one could list aversion to the communist ZMP or resist-
ance to Communist propaganda and criticism of the current political situa-
tion, especially of the ruling Party. All students of the Kraśnik district who 
received negative references were unambiguously listed by the local UB of-
fices as “the enemies of the People’s Democracy.”
It is worth mentioning that some of the students rejected by recruit-
ment commissions were allowed to enter Catholic University of Lublin. In 
that case employees of the repression apparatus tried to use the opportunity 
to introduce at the Catholic university their agents recruited from among 
high school students.48 That was the case of the secret UB associate from 
Łomża, code name “Anna” – a student of the local High School who, together 
with a dozen or so persons, was classified as the “alien class element” and 
thus deprived of the possibility of education at state universities.49
period was shortened by a month (AIPN Lu, 055/41, Instruction no. 7/50 regarding the col-
lection of profiles of students intending to enter university, Warsaw, 7 March 1950, k. 142; 
AIPN, BU, 01206/76, vol. 1, General note no. 3…, k. 41).
47 The event described after: P. Chmielowiec, Urząd bezpieczeństwa w Łańcucie, Rzeszów 
2006, p. 84; AIPN Lu, 033/37, Report of Department V of the PUBP in Kraśnik on April 1951, 
Kraśnik, 27 April 1951, k. 282-283.
48 In 1953, the MBP ordered secret associates, recruited from among  future high school 
graduates, to be sent to KUL (AIPN, BU, 0649/4, vol. 1, Report of Section IV of Department V 
of the MBP on May 1953, Warsaw, 3 April 1953, k. 69).
49 K. Sychowicz, Urząd Bezpieczeństwa w Łomży – powstanie i działalność (1944-1956), 
Białystok 2009, p. 203-204.
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Finally, the reports from 1954-1956 contain almost no information 
about the repression apparatus’ involvement in the enrolment process or 
its role in the vetting process. It is difficult to give an unambiguous explana-
tion of that fact. The possibility that the rapports have not been preserved 
or that these activities became routine procedures that UB employees would 
not even put in their schedules should not be ruled out.
Due to the lack of data it is impossible to estimate the exact number of 
people whom negative opinions of the state apparatus prevented from con-
tinuing education. Let us look at the numbers provided in 1951 by the repre-
sentative of the Ministry of Higher Education and Science responsible for vet-
ting candidates. That year, 35 thousand high school graduates declared that 
they wanted to continue their education. From this group, 600 people were 
not allowed to take entry exams due to the so-called individual objections (in 
most cases raised by UB employees). 8 thousand candidates failed entry ex-
ams, and 4 thousand were not admitted due to the lack of seats.50 However, at 
this point one objection must be made. We do not know exactly how many out 
of those 12 600 persons were rejected on the UB’s orders. We may only state 
that many “UB’s negative candidates” could be among those 600 people with 
the so-called individual objections. The issue could not be explained by the 
case of the Cracow district, where in 1950 20 percent of high school gradu-
ates were given negative opinions. At that point the KC PZPR intervened and 
ordered the number of persons placed on the proscription lists to be reduced 
to seven percent (some of them should not be allowed to take entry exams, 
while the rest should be “flunk” during the exam).51 On the other hand, the 
representatives of the Party authorities believed those “objections” to be an 
important part of eliminating “hostile elements,” which is why from time to 
time complaints would appear about the number of “negative opinions” being 
too small, especially regarding districts considered “hostile.”52
To sum up, it should be added that once the vetting process was con-
cluded, the repression apparatus would still take part in controlling student 
50 AAN, MSWiN, 332, Information on enrolment in the academic year 1951/1952, k. 2.
51 AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XVI - 126, Evaluation of the university enrolment action in Cracow 
in the academic year 1950/1951, b.d., k. 59-60.
52 For example, recruitment commissions in Warsaw got negative evaluations. It was 
believed that not enough “objections” were raised regarding the young inhabitants of 
Śródmieście (1,3 percent), believed to be a “typically bourgeois-intelligentsia” district. The 
irritation was magnified by the fact that more negative opinions were given in case of Wola, 
inhabited by the working class (14 percent) (ibidem, 237/XVI-25, Information on the work of 
the Warsaw Committee regarding higher education [1950], k. 36-37.
communities. Shortly after the matriculation, representatives of the repres-
sion apparatus could conduct a full selection of students by deciding who 
should be expelled. In the second half of 1949, the MBP initiated the crea-
tion of a “central scholarship record,” whose aim was to “eliminate hostile 
elements” from academic communities.53 A similar recommendation was 
repeated in the Ministry instruction of 1952. UB employees, after running a 
check on individual students and their families, should apply “various pre-
ventive measures.”54 According to the Director of Department V, those meas-
ures should include expulsion or deprival of scholarships. 
Summary
The part that security authorities played in the process of university enrol-
ment was a yet another example of how the social policy of the Party author-
ities got implemented. UB employees had been executing tasks connected 
with the negative selection of university candidates since the first decree of 
the Ministry of Education that regulated that issue came out (1947). Stu-
dent profiles, prepared by the UB, were one of the major factors deciding 
whether a given young person would be allowed to matriculate. Due to the 
full cooperation of members of Recruitment Commissions, especially those 
being part of the so-called social factor, the exam results of the “unwanted” 
persons were influenced. Even if their grades were positive, they would not 
get admitted under the pretext of the lack of seats. Therefore one could risk 
a statement that the UB played crucial part in establishing the social origin 
of student communities in 1947-1956, making sure – in accordance with the 
declarations – that “the youth with working class, peasant, and working in-
telligentsia origins, ideologically close to the goals of the working class, capa-
ble of conscious, creative participation in all areas of socialist engineering”55 
would enter university.   
To sum up, the creation of the “new” intelligentsia, as subservient to 
the regime, was not a uniquely Polish phenomenon. It was the factor of so-
vietisation of social and political environments in all the countries of the so-
called Eastern Bloc. It was the attempt to transfer the Soviet system of higher 
53 AIPN, BU, MBP, 491, Motions regarding the preventive-repressive action [1949], k. 32.
54 AIPN Lu, 055/43, Instruction no. 01/52 regarding fight against the hostile underground, 
sabotage, and youth hooliganism, Warsaw, 11 February 1952, k. 18-18v.
55 IPN, BU, 01206/75, vol. 1, Instruction no. 2/51…, k. 287.
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education and social and political role of the intelligentsia to these countries, 
even though those models were completely alien to the national cultures. In 
all these countries, the students’ admissions politics favoured “worker-peas-
ant” students. The communists regarded those young people as extremely 
malleable to ideology and weakly linked to the tradition – in contrast to “old” 
intelligentsia’s daughters and sons56.  
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